Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Essay

The topic that I need conducted look for on involves under bestride alcoholic beverageic beverageic beverage outlay and various levels of faculty member achievement. More specific completelyy, my determination is to conceptualize the increasing amounts of nonaged alcohol abuse by notice the affects set up that it has on somebodys GPA. Data obtained from the National shew on alcoholic beverage Abuse and Alcoholism suggests that four out of five college students consume alcohol. Of the students that consume alcohol, approximately fifty percent engage in binge drinking (NIAAA 2012).In consideration of the location where the story was conducted (University of overbold Hampshire), it seemed appropriate to pursue a topic that would potentially correlate with alcohol inlet. Past studies ca-ca enterpriseed to divvy up the issue of alcohol phthisis and its affects effects on schoolman achievement, yet none have constricted the independent variable to a specific age rage. trav el back to data wined from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, information was derived that suggested about seventy percent of minors have had at least one alcoholic beverage by the age of eighteen. In accordance with this finding, it was also recorded that although minors drink little often than adults, they do however tend to binge drink much often during an average drinking episode (NIAAA 2012).The objective of the present dissect is to better grasp an understanding of modest alcohol breathing in and academic achievement. With the focus of the age group being confined to individuals less than twenty one years of age, new findings go away be generated. The reduction of underage alcohol consumption is an extremely prevalent topic that legion(predicate) another(prenominal) insurance implementers and righteousness enforcement agencies ar faced with. Hopefully results from this study can gain a causal relationship that will aid professionals in dealin g with this dilemma not unaccompanied at the University of freshly Hampshire, but at universities across the nation.A plethora of studies have been conducted to observe the many prejudicious effects that come from alcohol consumption. For those that are unaware, alcohol is a stiff depressant that ultimately slows down your thinking and time of reaction (CTC 2013). Also, alcohol consumption can act as a precursor to things such(prenominal) as brain damage, heart disease, liver damage, ulcers and various types of cancer (CTC 2013). umteen individuals have been presented with similar facts, but they continue to drink alcohol. At the college level, many of the individuals that are consuming alcohol are under the legal age. insurance policy makers and law enforcement have been faced with this dilemma for an ongoing period of time. In attempts to control for alcohol consumption, many studies have been conducted to pinpoint the main causes. In a study conducted by Labrie et al. (2010) , family score of alcohol abuse and its effects on college students alcohol abuse were researched. Findings suggest that family history has a correlation with college students personal use devising them more prone to abuse (mostly males) (Labrie et al. 2010).With this finding however, stripped-down policy implications are suggested except for parental monitoring of socialization. In a study conducted by Rasul et al. (2011), the current drinking age is tested. Researchers were curious if a deduction in the current drinking age would have a successful attempt in diminishing heavy episodic drinking periods amongst college students. Findings imply that only in the rare case of high alcohol availability, and low levels of law enforcement, would the reduction of the drinking age have a small convinced(p) effect.With the full understanding of the prevalence of alcohol consumption in college in general, the enquiry is posed of the effect that it has on academic capital punishment. Th ere is a brief existence of literature that focuses directly on this topic. In a study conducted by Singleton (2007), he examines the relationship between alcohol consumption and academic performance while controlling for key background factors. When sit down scores and class ranks were controlled, a significant relationship for alcohol consumption and academic performance was observed (Singleton 2007). In a similar study conducted by Singleton and Wolfson (2009), they attempted to observe relationships between alcohol intake, sleep and academic performance. Main findings suggest that the most significant predictor of academic performance was sleep schedule. However, the association that high alcohol intake would result in poor sleep schedule ultimately effecting your academic achievement was ceremonious (Singleton and Wolfson 2009).Although past studies have observed alcohol consumption and its effects on academic achievement, none of them control for age. In the present study, t he collegiate existence that illegally consumes alcohol is examined. Findings will hopefully suggest that illegal alcohol consumption has a negative effect on academic achievement. If so, I will provide some policy implications that will inspection and repair address and potentially minimize underage alcohol consumption.* Null Hypothesis underage alcohol consumption has no affect effect on individual academic achievement. * Alternative Hypothesis underage alcohol consumption will have a negative effect on academic achievement.To gather the data necessary to study alcohol consumption and its effects on academic achievement, two mass questions were contributed to a general discipline peaceful by the spring 2013 modes of social research class at the University of New Hampshire. Our study was conducted in various classrooms at the University of New Hampshire using the method of convenience consume. This non-probability sampling method will produce un-representative results. Howev er, considering our limits of time and money, this sampling procedure was deemed the most rational. Professor Rebecca Glauber contacted five sociology professors teaching large find gives during the spring semester.These teachers agreed to let students in the methods of social research course field a survey to their students. No compensation was received by the participants. In the middle of April, three to four students in the methods of social research course attended the classes of these professors. During that time, the students stood in precedent of the class room and analyse a verbal recruitment statement. Upon completion of the statement, students handed out the surveys to all participants in the classroom. If the students agree to participate, they will anonymously fill out the survey. If at any time an individual felt uncomfortable and wished to remove their consent, that survey was destroyed. After completion, students placed their surveys in a box at the front of the room.Minimal risk is present in our study. On the survey, questions involving illegal shopping center use were present. This could potentially be considered a criminal liability, but since the survey was completed anonymously that factor is ruled out and the participants were protected. Also, questions involving states of mental health were present which could potentially have negative psychological effects on participants. There is no direct benefit to the participants of the study. However, results of this survey helped individuals in the methods of social research class obtain useful information that helped them draw conclusions that other than would not have been possible. In this particular study, no physical harm, and minimal psychological harm to the participants was present. In addition, the assurance of anonymity will help establish the goal of the benefits outweighing the risks.The variables used for this particular study were alcohol consumption and academic achievement . The independent variable, alcohol consumption, was (conceptually) theoretically defined by amount the amount of alcoholic beverages that are consumed in an average drinking episode. The question used to address this variable was, During an average drinking episode, about how many alcoholic drinks do you consume? There were five mutually sole(a) and exhaustive answers for participants to select from. (this sounds like it could be plagiarism so perhaps change that sentence.) The dependent variable, academic achievement, was conceptually defined by cadence students GPAs. The question used to address this variable was, What is your overall point point average (GPA)? Once again, there were five mutually unshared and exhaustive answers for participants to select from.

Languages of Love

Love is something that you give away and it comes right back to you. substantially evening every ace Old or young, rich or deplorable, we all gravel a God-given yearning to spot and be loved. However, due to the fallen domain we live in, a lot of people nowadays would have a hard sequence at transmiting their love to others. As a result, poor relationships ar developed. But thankfully, all Is not lost Have you hear of the Five Languages of Love? They are the means through which we can express or receive love.A proper understanding of these will greatly leaven our relationships. Today, allow me to share the top three love expressions in my life. These are Gift- broad, haggling of affirmation and fictitious character time. The first love language I learned, Gift-giving, was introduced by my parents while I was growing up. This, however, does not merely focalisation on the material pass judgment of the gift, but rather, on Its sentimental value to the giver. As much as I e njoy the tangible language of love, I also desire the intangible ones Words of affirmation and Quality mime.Some people may say that actions speak louder than words. But I for one believe that words do matter too. That Is the reason why Words of affirmation speaks to my heart as well. As I was brought up In a positive linguistic environment, Its easy for me to speak kind and support words to others. Lastly, my most cherished of all the love languages is Quality time. This involves giving each other an undivided attention while performing both activity, or by simply Ewing at each others side.What I love most about it is that, it provides a vessel for the memories of love in the years to come. To sum It up, understanding what kind of love language one speaks, Is the identify to developing meaningful relationships. Be it with your family, friends, or special someone. Take stigmatise that aside from these three, the other two are Acts of service and Physical touch. right away that I know what my primary love languages are, dont you think its about time you discovered yours?

Economic Interdependence

sparing Inter addiction and trial A possibility of workmanship Expectations Author(s) Dale C. Copeland Source Inter tribeal Security, Vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring, 1996), pp. 5-41 Published by The MIT Press Stable URL http//www. jstor. org/stable/2539041 Accessed 12/10/2010 1307 Your white plague of the JSTOR enumeration indicates your take awayance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http//www. jstor. org/ scalawag/info/ab come forth/policies/ harm. jsp.JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use go aparts, in part, t don un bantam you subscribe to obtained for fightd permission, you whitethorn non download an entire issue of a diary or multiple copies of terms, and you whitethorn use content in the JSTOR archive scarce for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact discipline may be obtained at http//www. jstor. org/ deed/showPublisher? publisherCode=mitpress.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must determine the same copyright nonice that appears on the screen or printed varlet of much(prenominal) transmission. JSTOR is a non-for-profit service that boosters scholars, researchers, and students disc everywhere, use, and fabricate upon a wide seethe of content in a trusted digital archive. We use info technology and tools to annex productivity and facilitate spic-and-span forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact email&160protected org.The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and pull up access to International Security. http//www. jstor. org Economic DaleC. Copeland Inter take c beence and fix of contend A surmisal of Trade Expectations Does scotch inter- colony increase or decrease the fortune of scatteralize of verbalise of state of war removede among articulates? With the arctic warf ar over, this question is taking on splendor as stack take aims betwixt establis hed indicators such as the fall in States and Russia and emerging powers such as japan, chinaware, and Western Europe grow to rude(a) heights.In this article, I provide a new slashing sup authority to help cross some of the speculative and empiric fusss with veritable free-handed and realist views on the question. The pro wanted debate between realists and detacheds on the causes of war has been by and colossal a debate about the relational salience of different causal variants. Realists striving such incidentors as relative power, man destitutes management on the absence seizure or presence of collective aegis regimes and the pervasiveness of participatory communities. Economic mutuality is the tho factor that plays an of the essence(p) causal role in the estimation process of both camps, and their perspectives atomic number 18 diametrically opposed. Liberals entreat that frugal inter dependance starting lineers the likeliness of war by chang e magnitude the look on of employ ment over the endorseary of onset inter leechlike state of matters would rather betray than invade. As immense as tall takes of Dale C. Copelands AssistantProfessorn the Department f Governmentnd im existentAffairsat the i i o a University f Virginia. oFor their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article, I would like to thank Robert Art, V. Natasha Copeland, Michael Desch, Angela Doll, tin brush run into Duffield, Matthew Evangelista, Ric straining Falkenrath, James Fearon, Joseph Grieco, Atsushi Ishida, Irving Lachow, A at long lastair lain Johnston, Andrew Kydd, Jack Levy, Lisa Martin, Michael Mastanduno, John Mearsheimer, Andrew Moravcsik, John Owen, Paul Papayoanou, Stephen Rhoads, Gideon Rose, Richard Rosecrance, Len Schoppa, Herman Schwartz, Randall Sch tho nearlyer, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, David Waldner, and Stephen Walt.This article as well benefited from presentations at the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security at the University of Chicago the University of Virginia Department of Governments faculty workshop the annual meeting of the Ameri stub policy-making Science Association, Chicago, September 1995 the Olin security workshop at the stub for International Affairs, Harvard University and the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (under whose auspices it was written). All errors detain mine. 1.For a marrow squashmary of the causal variables in the dickens schools, consume John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future Instability in Europe After the dusty War,InternationalSecurity, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56 Robert 0. Keohane, International Liberalism Reconsidered, in John Dunn, ed. , The EconomicLimits to newfangledPolitics (Cam brace Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 165-194. InternationalSecurity, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41 ? 1996 by the President and Fel first gears of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institu te of Technology InternationalSecurity 204 6 inter addiction screwing be fight downed, liberals assert, we nurse reason for optimism. Realists send packing the liberal leaning, arguing that high inter addiction increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In insurrection, states must constantly worry about their security. Accordingly, inter dependance-meaning mutual colony and olibanum vulnerability-gives states an motivator to pop war, if only to ensure go along access to incumbent materials and goods.The unsatisfactory nature of both liberal and realist theories is shown by their difficulties in explaining the run-ups to the 2 World Wars. The period up to World War I exposes a glaring anomaly for liberal opening the European powers had reached unprecedented take aims of mess, stock- redden off-tempered that did non pr sluicet them from acquittance to war. Realists trus iirthyly grant the correlation right-the war was preceded by high mutualness - however guile levels had been high for the previous thirty age hence, correct if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient.At root glance, the period from 1920 to 1940 find aneselfms to support liberalism over inbornism. In the 1920s, interdependence was high, and the world was essentially calmnessful in the 1930s, as entrenched protectionism caused interdependence to fall, international tautness rose to the point of world war. Yet the both most competitive states in the transcription during the 1930s, Germany and Japan, were in like manner the most highly unfree disrespect their efforts towards autarchy, relying on an other(a)(prenominal) states, including other commodious powers, for critical sensitive materials.Realism t here(predicate)fore actualisems correct in arguing that high dependence may put up to conflict, as states use war to ensure access to full of life goods. Realisms problem with the interwar era, however, is that Germany and Japan had been point more dependent in the 1920s, yet they sought- subsequently on(a) war only in the late 1930s when their dependence, although still remarkable, had fallen. The opening presented in this article-the theory of administer evaluateations-helps to resolve these problems.The theory starts by clear up the stamp of sparing interdependence, fusing the liberal insight that the benefits of peck give states an fillip to parry war with the realist view that the electric potential cost of being knock out john push states to war to promise vital goods. The add of the benefits and potential be of mickle versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if administer is all divide, the state not only loses the gains from passel exactly also suffers the be of ad skilfuling its deliverance to the new berth.Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectations of early tense raft, examini ng its come to on the boilers suit evaluate protect of the barter option if a state decides to antecede war. This supplements the static Economicnterdependence War 7 and I attachment in liberalism and naturalism of the levels of interdependence at any point in time, with the magnificence of leadership dynamic expectations into the proximo. Levels of interdependence and expectations of hereafter administer, considered simultaneously, lead to new auspicateions.mutualness butt end rear public security, as liberals fight, scarce this depart only be so when states expect that wiliness levels leaveing be high into the forestallable prospective. If highly interdependent states expect that slyness entrust be severely restricted-that is, if their expectations for future mint are low-realists are plausibly to be right the most highly dependent states willing be the one and only(a)nesss most believably to initiate war, for fear of losing the stinting wealthin ess that supports their long-run security. In short, high interdependence dope be all stay-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future mountain.This dynamic perspective helps bridge the gaps inside and between current approaches. Separating levels of interdependence from expectations of future passel indicates that states may be pushed into war even if current manage levels are high, if leaders bring forth good reason to suspect that others will cut them sullen in the future. In such a situation, the evaluate grade of trade will likely be prejudicious, and hence the foster of go on peace is also negative, making war an attractive pick.This insight helps resolve the liberal problem with World War I disdain high trade levels in 1913-14, declining expectations for future trade pushed German leaders to attack, to ensure long-term access to markets and raw materials. Even when current trade is low or non-existent, plus expectations for future trade will produce a haughty evaluate revalue for trade, and indeed an incentive for continued peace. This helps explain the devil main periods of detente between the frigidness War superpowers, from 1971 to 1973 and in the late eighties irresponsible signs from U. S. eaders that trade would soon be significantly increased coaxed the Soviets into a more cooperative relationship, reducing the probability of war. But in situations of low trade where there is no prospect that high trade levels will be restored in the future, highly dependent states may be pushed into conflict. This was the German and Japanese dilemma in the lead World War II. The article is shared out into three subdivisions. The commencement ceremony section reviews liberal and realist theories on the relationship between frugal interdependence and the probability of war, and provides a critique of both theories.The second section lays out trade expectations theory The final section examines the diplomatical hi storical evidence for the new theory against twain significant plates Germany Internationalecurity204 8 S out front World War I and Germany before World War II. The evidence indicates that the new variable, expectations of future trade, helps resolve the anomalies for current theories in both cases, negative expectations for future trade, combined with high dependence, conduct leaders into total war out of fear for their long-term sparing position and whencece security.TheLiberal nd RealistDebateon Economic nterdependence a I War and The philia liberal position is straightforward. 2 Trade provides valuable benefits, or gains from trade, to any contingent state. A dependent state should therefore attempt to avoid war, since self-possessed commerce gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war. Trade pays more than war, so dependent states should prefer to trade not invade. This argument is a good deal supported by the auxiliary propo sition that in advance(p)-day technology dandyly increases the costs and risks of aggression, making the trading option even more clear-sighted.The argument was first made popular in the 1850s by Richard Cobden, who asserted that free trade unites states, making each equally fervent for the prosperity and happiness of both. 3 This view was restated in The majusculeIllusion by Norman Angell just prior to World War I and again in 1933. Angell axiom states having to choose between new ways of thinking, namely calm trade, and the old method of power politics. Even if war was once economic, moderneization now craps it impossible to enrich oneself by force indeed, by destroying trading bonds, war is commercially suicidal. 4 wherefore do wars nevertheless keep? bit the start of World War I just later The GreatIllusions initial publication might tellm to refute his thesis, Angell in 2. quadruplet other subsidiary liberal arguments, employing intervening variables, are not sufficiently compelling to discuss here. The first suggests that high trade levels promote house servant prosperity, thereby lessening the sexual problems that push leaders into war. The second argues that interdependence helps to foster increased intellect between peoples, which reduces the mis spirits that lead to war.The third asserts that trade alters the interior(prenominal) building of states, heightening the influence of groups with a vested interest in peaceful trade. The final argument contends that trade has the spill-over effect of increasing policy-making ties between trading partners, frankincense improving the prospects for long-term cooperation. For an critical analysis of these views, see Dale Copeland, Economic interdependence and the irruption of War,paper presented to University of Virginia Department of Governments faculty workshop, March 1995. 3. Richard Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London T.Fischer Unwin, 1903), p. 225. 4. Norman A ngell, The GreatIllusion, 2d ed. ( spic-and-span York G. P Putnams Sons, 1933), pp. 33, 59-60, 87-89. Economicnterdependence WarI 9 I and the 1933 edition argued that the debacle only when confirmed the unprofitability of modern wars. He thus upheld the common liberal view that wars, especially major(ip) wars, result from the misperceptions of leaders caught up in the outmoded belief that war still pays. Accordingly, his is not a plea for the impossibility of war and for its futility, since our ignorance on this matter makes war not only possible, only exceedingly likely. 5 In short, if leaders fail to see how unprofitable war is compared to the benefits of trade, they may still erroneously choose the former. Richard Rosecrance provides the most extensive update of the CobdenAngell thesis to the nuclear era. States must choose between being trading states, have-to doe with with promoting wealth through commerce, and territorial reserve states, obsessed with military expansion . Modern conditions push states towards a predominantly trading mode wars are not only too costly, but with the peaceful trading option, the benefits that one nation gains from trade can also be realized by others. When the arranging is highly interdependent, therefore, the incentive to wage war is absent, since trading states recognize that they can do better through internal economic development preserve by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by move to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land. 6 Rosecrance thus neatly summarizes the liberal view that high interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading. 7 5. Ibid. , pp. 59-62, 256. i S a 6. RichardRosecrance,The rising slope of the Trading tateCommercend Conquestn the ModernWorld (New York Basic Books, 1986), pp. 3-14 24-25 ( fierceness added) see also Rosecrance, War, a Trade and mutualness, in James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp, eds. , mutuality nd Conflict in WorldPolitics (A ldershot, U. K. Avebury, 1989), pp. 48-57 Rosecrance, A New Concert of forefingers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82. 7. A book often seen as a statement on the peace-inducing effects of interdependence-Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence(Boston Little, Brown, 1977)-actually contains no such causal argument. For Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence is more peaceful by definition it is a valuable concept for analyzing the semipolitical process only when military force is unthinkable (pp. 29, 24). In the second edition since we check complex interdependence in terms of policy goals and instruments, arguments about how goals and instruments are touch by the degree to which a situation approximates complex interdependence or reality will be tautological. Thus, we are left essentially with two dependent variables changes in agendas and changes in the roles of international organizations. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdepend ence, d ed. (Glenview, Ill. Scott, Foresman, 1989), p. 255 emphasis in original. 2 The dependent variable of this article-the likelihood of war-is nowhere to be found, which is not surprising, since it is assumed away. Other works on interdependence from the 1970s, which largely examined dependent variables other than war, are discussed in Copeland, Economic Interdependence and the Outbreak of War. InternationalSecurity 204 10 Realists turn the liberal argument on its head, arguing that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war. States strikeed about security will dislike dependence, since it means that crucial imported goods could be cut off during a crisis. This problem is particularly acute for imports like oil and raw materials while they may be only a small helping of the total import bill, without them most modern economies would collapse. Consequently, states dependent on others for vital goods have an increased incentive to go to war to assure themselves of continued access of supply. Neorealist Ken wageh Waltz puts the argument as follows actors within a house servant polity have little reason to fear the dependence that goes with specialization.The anarchical structure of international politics, however, makes states worry about their vulnerability, thus compelling them to picture what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency. For Waltz, it is this simple thought that explains, among other things, their imperial thrusts to widen the s oversee of their control. 9 For John Mearsheimer, nations that depend on others for critical economic supplies will fear cutoff or blackmail in time of crisis or war. Consequently, they may try to branch out political control to the radical of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source or with its other customers. Interdependence, therefore, will probably lead to great security competition. 10 8. One might contend that realist s doubt the causal importance of economic interdependence, since relative gains concerns convince great powers to avoid becoming dependent in the first place. Aside from arguments showing why states may get together despite concerns for relative gains (see es ranges by Powell, Snidal, and Keohane in David A. Baldwin, ed. , Neorealismand NeoliberalismThe Contemporary ebate New York Columbia University Press, 1993 Dale Copeland, Why Relative DGains Concerns May Promote Economic Cooperation A Realist Explanation for Great Power Interdependence, presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, April 1996), the argument is empirically false. Periods of high interdependence have arisen even when the security competition between great powers was particularly intense, such as from 1880 to 1914, as Waltz acknowledges. Kenneth Waltz, The romance of Interdependence, in Ray Maghoori and Bennett Ramberg, Globalism versus Realism (Boulder, Colo. Westview Pr ess, 1982), p. 83.Since the reality of high interdependence cannot be argued or assumed away, I focus here on the core realist claim that whenever high levels of interdependence are reached, for whatever reason, war is more likely. 9. Kenneth Waltz, conjecture of InternationalPolitics (New York Random House, 1979), p. 106. 10. John J. Mearsheimer, Disorder Restored, in Graham Allison and Gregory F Treverton, eds. , Rethinking Americas Security (New York W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 223 Mearsheimer, Back to the Future, p. 45. hold okay also Robert Gilpin, Economic Interdependence and subject area Security in Historical Perspective, in Klaus Knorr and Frank N.Trager, eds. , Economic Issues and field Security (Lawrence, Kan. Allen, 1977), p. 29. Adopting the realist argument, but emphasizing how dependence leads states to adopt destabilizing offensive strategies, is Anne Uchitel, Interdepend- Economicnterdependence War 11 and I This modern realist understanding of economic interdepend ence and war finds its roots in mercantilist writings dating from the seventeenth century Mercantilists saw states as locked in a competition for relative power and for the wealth that underpins that power. For mercantilists, imperial expansionthe acquisition of colonies-is compulsive by the states need to secure greater control over sources of supply and markets for its goods, and to build relative power in the process. By allowing the metropole and the colonies to contract in proceeds and trade of complementary products (particularly make goods for raw materials), while ensuring political control over the process, colonies opened up the possibility of providing a system of supply within a collected empire. 2 In this, we see the underpinning for the neorealist view that interdependence leads to war.Mercantilist imperialism represents a reception to a states dependence states reduce their fears of external specialization by increasing internal specialization within a now larger political realm. The imperial state as it expands thus acquires more and more of the characteristics of Waltzs domesticated polity, with its hierarchy of specialized consorts secure from the unpredictable policies of others. In sum, realists test to underline one main point political concerns driven by anarchy must be injected into the liberal calculus.Since states must be primarily concerned with security and therefore with control over resources and markets, one must give the sack the liberal optimism that great trading partners will always continue to be great trading partners simply because both states benefit absolutely. Accordingly, a state vulnerable to anothers policies because of dependence will tend to use force to overcome that vulnerability. ence and Instability, in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds. , Coping with Complexityin the International System (Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1993), pp. 43-264. For Barry Buzan, since liberal free-trading systems are depend ent on a hegemon which invariably declines, such systems are indentured to fall into malevolent mercantilist practices, as states scramble to control access to goods at a time safeguarded by the hegemon. Avoiding the liberal system altogether, through a benign mercantilist system of self-sufficient trading blocs, will be therefore preferred. Buzan, Economic grammatical construction and International Security The Limits of the Liberal Case, International Organization, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), esp. pp. 597, 609-623. For a similar argument, see Robert Gilpin, U. S. Power and the Multinational Corporation(New York Basic Books), 1975, p. 259. 11. discipline Eli F Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, trans. Mendel Shapiro (London George Allen, 1931), p. 15 Jacob Viner, Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 10 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft(Princeton, N. J. Princeton Univ ersity Press, 1985), chap. . 12. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. 2, p. 40. InternationalSecurity 204 12 A COMPARISON OF THE LIBERAL AND REALIST PERSPECTIVES man the liberal and the realist arguments display critical disputes, they possess one important proportion the causal logic of both perspectives is founded on an various(prenominal) states termination-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term interdependence, both derive predictions from with their own specialized how particular decision-making units-states-deal dependence.This allows both theories to handle situations of asymmetric interdependence, where one state in a dyad is more dependent than the other. Their predictions are internally unchanging, but opposed liberals argue that the more dependent state is less likely to initiate conflict, since it has more to lose from breaking economic ties13 realists maintain that this state is more likely to initiate conflict, to escape its vulnerability. Th e main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence.The realist argument highlights an perspective that is severely downplayed in the liberal argument, namely, consideration of the potential costs from the disunite of a trading relationship. Most liberals, if pressed, would probably accept David Baldwins conceptualization of dependence as the probability costs a state would experience should trade end. Yet Baldwins opportunity costs are only the loss of the benefits from trade received afterwards a state moves from autarchy. 14 It is this understanding of opportunity costs that is followed in the most comprehensive liberal argument for interdependence and peace, that of Rosecrance.There is little sense in Rosecrances work that a states decision to specialize and thus to restructure its economy radically can entail enormous costs of readjustment should trade be later break up, nor that such costs can actually put the state in a far worse position than if it had never moved from autarchy in the first place. 15 This is the concern of realists when they talk about dependence on 13. find Keohane and Nye, World Politics and the International Economic System, in C. Fred Bergsten, ed. , The Future of the InternationalEconomicOrder (Lexington D. C.Heath, 1973), pp. 121122 Neil R. Richardson and Charles W. Kegley, Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance, International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1980), pp. 191-222. 14. David A. Baldwin, Interdependence and Power A Conceptual Analysis, International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 478, 482-484, 489 Baldwin, The Power of Positive Sanctions, WorldPolitics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19-38 Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the social structure of Foreign Trade,exp. ed. (Berkeley University of California Press, 1980), chap. . 15. On the costs of adjustment, see Ruth Arad, collarv Hirsch, and Alfred Tovias, The Economicsof Peacemaking(New York St. Martins Press, 1983), pp. 26-34. Keohane and Nye examine the costs of adjusting as an integral part of vulnerability interdependence (Power and Interdependence, p. 13). Yet they do not establish the original autarchic position as a baseline for examining these costs independently from the benefits of trade forgone this baseline is incorporated later in EconomicInterdependence nd War 13 a vital goods such as oil.A state that chooses not to buy oil from outsiders forgoes certain benefits of trade, but by operating on domestic energy sources, it avoids the heavy penalization experienced by a state that does base its industrial structure on imported oil, only to find itself cut off from supplies. That Rosecrance minimizes this realist concern is evident. In an explicit effort to refute Waltzs definition of interdependence as a trading link which is costly to break, Rosecrance contends that to measure interdependence in this way misses the essence of the concept. His subsequent discussion emphasizes only the benefits that states give up if they choose not to trade (his opportunity costs), and makes no identify of any potentially severe costs of adjustment. In fact, he argues that dependence on such things as foreign sources of energy is very no different than relying on outsiders for fashions or different makes of cars if trade is cut off, a state loses only consumer choice. Recognition that the whole industrial structure of a state might be undermined or destroyed by an adversarys separate of vital trade is absent. 6 Rosecrance is reluctant to acknowledge realist concerns, perhaps because to do so would imply that dependent states might be more un squeeze to go to war, as realists maintain, while Rosecrance is arguing that they are less unstrained to do so. 17 This points to a critical distinction between liberalism and realism that illuminates the liberal understanding of why wars ultimately occur. For liberals, interdependence does not have a downside that might push states into war, as realists contend. Rather, interdependence is seen to operate as a control condition on aggressive tendencies arising from the domestic or individual levels.If interdependence beseems low, this restraint is taken away, allowing the aggressive tendencies to dominate. To borrow a fable from Plato for liberals, inter- building the new theory. Liberals also consider costs in terms of losses in autonomy due to trade ties see Richard N. Cooper, The Economicsof Interdependence New YorkMcGraw Hill, 1968), ( pp. 4-12 Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, pp. 39-41, 235. Note, however, that these are costs that go hand in hand with high trade, not costs that are experienced if trade is cut off.Hence, these losses in autonomy are more accurately considered as a form of sensitivity interdependencecosts incurred when trade is ongoing-rather than as a form of vulnerability interdependence so worrying to r ealists. On this, see Keohane and Nye, International Interdependence and Integration, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. , Handbook of Political Science, vol. 8 (Reading, Mass. Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 368-370. 16. Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, pp. 144-145. In the appendix, an iterated prisoners dilemma is used to show the concrete benefits from trade cooperation.If states decide not to cooperate, they simply do not benefit pp. 233-236. 17. Rosecrance occasionally seems to accept that some goods are more vital than others, but even here he reiterates the liberal argument Countries dependent on the world economy for markets, assistance, and critical raw materials are doubly hesitant to embark on military adventures ibid. , p. 133, emphasis added. InternationalSecurity 204 14 dependence operates like the reins on the dark horse of inner passions it provides a material incentive to stay at peace, even when there are internal predispositions towards aggression .Remove the reins, however, and these passions are free to roam as they will. 18 This point becomes clearer as one examines Rosecrances explanations for the two World Wars. World War II, for Rosecrance, was ultimately domestically driven. The main aggressors saw war as a means to cope with the upheavals flowing from social discontent and chaos and the danger of left-wing revolutions apt(p) these upheavals, it is not surprising that the territorial and military-political system i. e. , war emerged as an acceptable option to more than one state. Connecting the Second World War to causes arising from the unit level in the First World War,he continues If Germany, Italy, and Japan did not fulfill their territorial ambitions at the end of World War I, they might develop even more nationalistic and solidaristic regimes and try again. 19With trade and therefore interdependence at low levels in the 1930s, economics offered no alternative possibility it failed to provide what he later refer s to as a mitigating or restraining influence on unit-level motives for war. 0 World War I is a problematic case for Rosecrance, as it was for Angell, since the great powers went to war even though trade levels were still high. Like Angell, Rosecrances main defense of liberalism is that leaders simply did not see how beneficial interdependence was, and how costly war would be. Due to outmoded ideas and unit-level pathologies, they misperceived the situation hence, interdependence could not operate as it should, as a restraint on aggression. He talks about leaders obsession with nationalist ambitions and chemical equilibrium of power politics. He suggests that no pre-1914 statesman or financier was full aware of the damage that war would do to the European body economic because of the ir sage belief that war would be over very 18. See Platos Phaedrus in Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth Penguin, 1973), sections 246-256. The historical roots of this view are explicated in f b i P Albert 0. Hirschman,The Passionsand the Interests oliticalArgumentsor Capitalism efore ts Triumph(Princeton Princeton University Press, 1977).He quotes Montesquieu (ibid. , p. 73) It is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, though their passions may prompt them to be wicked, they have nevertheless an interest in not being so. 19. Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, pp. 102-103 (see also p. 111). Rosecrance does point out that Germany and Japan apparently went to war also to gain raw materials (ibid. , p. 108). He does not argue, however, that these two states were more dependent than other states for such materials to have done so would suggest the validity of the realist logic. 0. See ibid. , pp. 106, 123, 150, 162. EconomicInterdependence nd War 15 a quickly. 21At one point, he even seems to cast doubt on the efficacy of interdependence as a restraint on aggression One should not place too much emphasis upon the earth of interde pendence per se. European nations in 1913 relied upon the trade and investment that flowed between them that did not prevent the political crisis which led to World War I. Interdependence only constrains national policy if leaders accept and agree to work within its limits. 22It thus appears that Rosecrance cannot really envision interdependence as being anything but a constraint or restraint on unit-level tendencies to aggress. This view is consistent with the general liberal perspective that all wars are ultimately driven by unit-level phenomena such as misperceptions, authoritarianism, ideology, and internal social conflict. Rosecrances historical understanding of the World War II, for example, would fit nicely with the democratic peace belles-lettres had all the states in 1939 been democratic, war would probably ot have occurred despite the cut off global economic situation, but since some states were not democratic, their aggressive domestic forces became unfettered once int erdependence had declined. The idea that economic factors by themselves can push states to aggress-an argument consistent with neorealism and the alternative theory I will present below-is outside the realm of liberal thought, since it would imply that purely systemic forces can be responsible for war, largely regardless of unit-level phenomena. 3 While liberal theory for certain downplays the realist concern for the potential costs of severed trade, it is also clear that realists slight the validating role the benefits of trade can have on a states choice between peace and war. In the next section, I bring together the liberal emphasis on benefits with the realist emphasis on costs to create a framework for understanding the true level of dependence a state faces. This section also seeks to correct the most significant 21. See ibid. , pp. 18-19, 88, 96-97, 99, 150. 22. Ibid. , p. 141 (see also p. 150).The argument here borders on being non-falsifiable disconfirming cases where wa r occurs despite high interdependence can be sidestepped by saying simply that states did not accept being peaceful traders. Note as well that if states have already decided to be peaceful, thusly interdependence is not needed as a restraint. 23. On liberalisms inherently unit-level orientation to conflict, see Andrew Moravcsik, Liberalism and International Relations Theory, Working Paper, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1992 Michael Howard, War and the LiberalConscience (New Brunswick Rutgers University Press, 1978).On the democratic peace argument, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1993). InternationalSecurity 204 16 error in both liberal and realist theories, namely, their lack of theoretical attention to the dynamics of state expectations for the future. o Trade r run over? A Theory f Trade xpectations E o This section introduces the theory of trade expectations.This theory extends liberal and realist views regarding interdependence and war, by synthesizing their strengths while formulating a dynamic perspective on state decision-making that is at outdo only implicit in current approaches. The strength of liberalism lies in its consideration of how the benefits or gains from trade give states a material incentive to avoid war, even when they have unit-level predispositions to favor it. The strength of realism is its recognition that states may be vulnerable to the potential costs of being cut off from trade on which they depend for wealth and ultimately security.Current theories, however, lack a way to fuse the benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade into one theoretical framework. More significantly, these theories lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war. Both liberalism and realism often refer to the future trading environment, particularly in empirical analyses. But in c onstructing a theoretical logic, the two camps consider the future only within their own ideological presuppositions.Liberals, assuming that states seek to increase absolute welfare, maintain that situations of high trade should continue into the foreseeable future as long as states are rational such actors have no reason to forsake the benefits from trade, especially if defection from the trading brass will only lead to retaliation. 24 Given this presupposition, liberals can argue that interdependence-as reflected in high trade at any particular wink in time-will foster peace, given the benefits of trade over war.Realists, assuming states seek to maximize security, argue that concerns for relative power and autonomy will lastly push some states to sever trade ties (at least in the absence of a hegemon). Hence, realists can insist that interdependence, again manifest as high trade at any moment in time, drives dependent states to initiate war now to escape potential vulnerability later. For the purposes of forging brawny theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism.Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a 24. See Rosecrance, Rise of the TradingState, appendix. EconomicInterdependence nd War 17 a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate. Accordingly, we need a theory that incorporates how a states expectations of its trading environment-either confident(p) or pessimistic-affect its decision-calculus for war or peace. This is where the new theory makes its most significant departure.Liberalism and realism are theories of comparative statics, drawing predictions from a snapshot of the level of interdependence at a single point in time. The new theory, on the other hand, is dynamic in its internal structure it provides a new variable, the expectations of future trade, that incorporates i n the theoretical logic an actors sense of the future trends and possibilities. 25 This variable is essential to any leaders determination not just of the immediate value of peace versus war at a particular moment in time, but of the overall anticipate value of peace and war over the foreseeable future.From consideration of the expectations-of-future-trade variable along with a states level of dependence, one can derive a consistent deductive theory of state decision-making showing the conditions under which high interdependence will lead to peace or to war. High interdependence can be peace-inducing, as liberals maintain, as long as states expect future trade levels to be high in the future positive expectations for future trade will lead dependent states to assign a high expect value to a continuation of peaceful trade, making war the less appealing option.If, however, a highly dependent state expects future trade to be low due to the policy decisions of the other side, then real ists are likely to be correct the state will attach a low or even negative expect value to continued peace without trade, making war an attractive alternative if its expected value is greater than peace. Moreover, since a negative expected value of trade implies a long-term decline in power, even if war is not profitable per se, it may be chosen as the lesser of two evils. 26 5. On the differences between comparative statics and dynamic analyses that incorporate the future, see Eugene Silberberg, The Structure of Economics, 2d ed. (New York McGraw-Hill, 1990), chaps. 1, 12, and 18. 26. That is, war is rational if it has either a higher net positive value or a lower net negative value. The theory thus works regardless of whether states are innately close-seeking positive gains from war-or simply security-seekers desiring to minimize long-term threats. See Charles L.Glaser, Political Consequences of armed services Strategy Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models, Worl dPolitics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. By connecting the trading environment to fears about relative decline, I draw upon the notion that declining states launch preventive wars to uphold their waning security. Elsewhere, I build a solely power-driven theory showing why states faced with robust and inevitable decline initiate major wars. Dale Copeland, Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar constancy Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War, Security Studies, Vol. , No. 3 (Spring 1996). S 2 International ecurity 04 18 The deductive logic of the alternative theory, as with liberalism and realism, centers on an individual states efforts to share its own situation of dependence. Consider a two-actor scenario, where one state A may trade with another state B. If state A moves away from the initial position of autarchy to begin trading, and trade is free and open, it will expect to receive the benefits of trade stressed by liberals, namely, the incremental increase in As total welfare due to trade. 7 Note that a state can still be aware of the benefits of trade even if present trade is non-existent, since they represent the potential gains from trade that would accrue to the state should trade levels become high in the future. 28It is a states ability to foresee future potential benefits that allows it to attach a high expected value to the peaceful trading option even when current trade levels are low (as long as it expects current restrictions to be relaxed). When a state trades, it specializes in and exports goods in which it enjoys a comparative advantage, while forgoing the production of other goods, which it then imports.This process of specialization, however, entails potentially large costs of adjustment if trade is subsequently cut off. This is especially so in the modern world if the state becomes dependent on foreign oil and certain raw materials. With the economys capital infrastructure (machines, factories, transportation systems, etc. ) geared to function only with such vital goods, a severing of trade would visit huge costs as the economy struggles to cope with the new no-trade situation. 29 In short, the severing of trade, as realists would argue, would put the state in a situation far worse than if it had never specialized in the first place.This analysis leads to a clearer understanding of any particular states total level of dependence. On a bilateral basis, that level is represented by the sum of the benefits that the state would receive from free and open trade with another state (versus autarchy), and the costs to the state of being cut off from that trade after having specialized (versus autarchy). If state A started with an economy of 100 units of gross national product before any trade with B (the autarchic position), and open trade with B would mean economic expansion to a level of 110 units of GNP on an ongoing basis, then the benefits of trade could be considered as 10 units.If the specializ ation that trade entails, however, would mean the 27. This is consistent with standard trade theory. See Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones, World Tradeand Payments, 4th ed. (Boston Little Brown, 1985), chaps. 3-4. 28. I thank Andrew Moravcsik for discussions on the potential benefits of trade. 29. The capital investments represent sunk costs not easily recouped. See Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economicsof Peacemaking,pp. 26-28. EconomicInterdependence nd War I 19 a conomy would fall to 85 units should B sever trade ties, then the costs of severed trade would be 15 units versus autarchy. State As total dependence level would thus be the benefits of trade plus the costs of severed trade after specialization, or 25 units. The dependence level will itself be a function of such parameters as the overall compatibilities of the two economies for trade, the degree of As need for vital goods such as oil and raw materials, and the availability of alternative suppliers and markets.Thus if As need for trade with B is great because the economies are highly matched (say, in terms of mutual comparative advantages), B has valuable natural resources that A lacks, and A has few other countries to turn to, then As dependence can be considered high. 30 In deciding between peace and war, however, a state can not refer simply to its dependence level. Rather, it must determine the overall expected value of trade and therefore the value of continued peace into the foreseeable future.The benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade on their own say nothing about this expected value. Dynamic expectations of future trade must be brought in. If the state has positive expectations that the other will maintain free and open trade over the long term, then the expected value of trade will be close to the value of the benefits of trade. On the other hand, if the state, after having specialized, comes to expect that trade will be severed by the trading partner, then the expected valu e of trade may be highly negative, that is, close to the value of the costs of severed trade.In essence, the expected value of trade may be anywhere between the two extremes, depending on a states estimate of the expected probability of securing open trade, or of being cut off. 31 This leads to a crucial hypothesis. For any given expected value of war, we can predict that the lower the expectations of future trade, the lower the 30. On the importance of altematives, see Baldwin, Interdependence and Power, p. 482 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, . 13. It is worth remembering that alternative suppliers p nd markets are only valuable in reducing As dependence if A can get access to them. If B is able not only to sever bilateral trade, but also to blockade A to prevent third-party trading, then A effectively has no alternatives and is therefore dependent. This was the situation for Japan loveseat the United States before 1941 regarding oil imports. 31. This line of reasoning is developed officially in Dale Copeland, example Economic Interdependence and War A Theory of Trade Expectations, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995.It is consistent with consideration of the probability of dealing as a determinant of expected national income in Arad, Hirsch, and Tovias, The Economicof Peacemaking,pp. 37-43, although they do not employ expectations of future trade as a theoretical variable affecting the likelihood of war. InternationalSecurity 204 20 expected value of trade, and therefore the more likely it is that war will be chosen. It is important to note that the expected value of trade will not be based on the level of trade at a particular moment in time, but upon the stream of expected trade levels into the future.It really does not matter that trade is high today if state A knows that B will cut all trade tomorrow and shows no signs of being willing to restore it later, the expect ed value of trade would be negative. Similarly, it does not matter if there is little or no trade at present if state A is confident that B is connected to freer trade in the future, the expected value of trade would be positive. The fact that the expected value of trade can be negative even if present trade is high, due to low expectations for future trade, goes a long way towards resolving such manifest anomalies for liberal theory as German aggression in World War I.Despite high levels of trade up to 1914, German leaders had good reason to believe that the other great powers would undermine this trade into the future hence, a war to secure control over raw materials and markets was required for the long-term security of the German nation. Since the expected value of trade can be positive even though present trade is low, due to high expectations for future trade, we can also understand such phenomena as the periods of detente in U. S. -Soviet relations during the Cold War (1971- 73 and after 1985).While East-West trade was still relatively low during these times, the Soviet need for Western technology, combined with a growing belief that large increases in trade with the West would be forthcoming, gave the Soviets a high abundant expected value of trade to convince them to be more conform to in superpower relations. 32 In making the final decision between peace and war, however, a rational state will have to compare the expected value of trade to the expected value of going to war with the other state. The expected value of war, as a realist would emphasize, cannot be ascertained without considering the relative power balance.As one state moves from a position of relative inferiority in economic and military power to relative superiority, the expected value of war will move from negative to positive or even highly positive. This proposition follows directly from the insights of deterrence theory the larger the state in relative size, the higher the probab ility of engaging a achievement, while the lower the costs of fighting the war. 33 32. The U. S. -Soviet Cold War case is covered in Copeland, Modelling Economic Interdependence and War. 33. See Alexander L.George and Richard Smoke, Deterrencein AmericanForeign Policy Theoryand Practice (New York Columbia University Press, 1974), chaps. 2-3. a EconomicInterdependence nd War 21 Hence, if victory entails occupying the other state and absorbing its economy, war can take on a very positive expected value when a large power attacks a small state. 34 For example, if Iraq had been allowed to hold on to Kuwait after its August 1990 invasion, war for Iraq would certainly have paid. Similarly, Czechoslovakia was an easy and attractive target for Germany by 1938-39, as were the other smaller states of Europe, nd evidence suggests that war against these nations was indeed profitable for the Nazis. 35 On the other hand, war between more equal great powers is likely to have a much lower or e ven negative expected value. The Spartan leadership took Sparta into war against Athens in 431 BC, for example, under no illusions that war would be a profitable venture. 36 While the Athenian economy presented a large prize should victory be attained, war with a near-equal adversary could be expected to be very costly, with a low likelihood of victory.Where we would anticipate a low or negative expected value to the option of war, the expectations-of-future-trade variable should have a determinant effect on the likelihood of war. If state A has positive expectations for future trade with B, and A and B are roughly equal in relative power, then state A will assign a high expected value to continued peaceful trade, will compare this to the low or negative expected value for invasion, and will choose peace as the rational strategy.The higher As dependence and the higher the expectations for future trade, the higher the expected value for peaceful trade, and therefore the more likely A is to avoid war. But if state A is dependent and has negative expectations for future trade with B, then the expected value of trade will be very low or negative. If the expected value for trade is lower than the expected value for invasion, war becomes the rational choice, and this is so even when the expected value of invasion is itself negative war becomes the lesser of two evils. 7 34. This is developed formally in Copeland, Modelling Economic Interdependence and War. 35. See Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The ontogeny of Occupied Industrial Economies (Ph. D. diss. , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991). 36. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War,trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth Penguin, 1954), Book 1, lines 80-88. 37. When one state is very large and the other very small, it is harder to sort out the effects of interdependence from the effects of relative power, at least in actual cases of war.The expected value of war for the superior state is likely to be quite posi tive anyway, and thus will tend to overlook the expected value of trade even when the state has positive expectations of future trade. Here, the superior state simply chooses war as the greater of two goods. This choice would not be altered by any decrease of trade expectations indeed, war would simply be even more rational as the expected value of trade (and therefore peace) falls.War in such a situation of marked power imbalance and low expectations of future trade is thus overdetermined it would be difficult to tell whether war occurred because of the positive expected value of war, the negative expected value of trade, or both. Thus, in my empirical analysis, I examine cases where great powers InternationalSecurity 204 22 Until now, I have talked about state As expectations of future trade as though they were an essentially exogenous, that is, as though state B, in its willingness to trade with A, were not affected by As behavior.If, however, state A, by making political, m ilitary, or economic concessions, can induce B to relax trading restrictions, then As low expectations for future trade may be raised. This suggests that the effects of circumspection and bargaining need to be integrated into any extended historical analysis. 38 The probability of B trading with A is never completely independent of As actions, since there is always some concession that A could make to get B to commit to higher trade levels over the long term.But the problem for A is that Bs price for high trade may be unacceptable in that it undermines As internal stability or its external power position. To take an extreme example, if B were to demand, as the price for higher trade, that A unilaterally disarm and allow B to occupy A with its army, it is hard to imagine A accepting such a deal. If B carcass unwilling to budge from such an exorbitant demand, then it is fair to say that As pessimistic expectation for future trade is exogenous there is little A can do, short of natio nal suicide, to improve the likelihood of trade.Thus state A, in estimating Bs probability of trading with A, will refer to many indicators suggesting how commonsense B will be into the future, that is, how willing B will be to trade, and at what price. One may think of these indicators simply as causal factors affecting the variable expectations of future trade. Such systemic factors as Bs economic competitiveness, Bs rate of depletion of raw materials and energy reserves (affecting its future export ability), and military pressures constraining Bs trade with A will be important.German leaders before World War I, for example, had good reason to believe that Britain would be forced to move to imperial preference to protect its empire from the German economic challenge and to lend support to its entente partners. Japanese leaders in the late 1930s recognized that the United States would have to cut back on oil and iron exports to Japan as U. S. reserves were attacked great powers i n long and costly total wars. While these cases do not cover the universe of wars, they do isolate the role of economic interdependence and changing expectations of future trade in the outbreak of war. 8. Given quadriceps femoris constraints, my case studies in this article do not provide a full analysis of the bargaining dynamic. For an analysis of interstate economic bargaining, see Baldwin, Economic Statecraft,chap. 6 R. Harrison Wagner, Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence, InternationalOrganization,Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 461-483. Note also that there may be a causal feedback loop, whereby increasing fears of war lead others to reduce trade, which in turn heightens the incentive of dependent states to initiate war.These and other issues involving the endogeneity of trade expectations are addressed more fully in my book manuscript, Economic Interdependence and War. EconomicInterdependence nd War 23 a depleted or needed to supply a mili tary buildup (even one directed only at Germany). Such systemic pressures on B to reduce trade with A will foster negative expectations of future trade among As leaders. But domestic and personal factors can also play a significant role in the exogenous rise or decline in Bs likelihood of trading with A, indicating hat the assumption that B is a unitary actor must be relaxed to some degree when examining memoir. 39 In 1972, for example, the Soviets saw Nixon and Kissinger as firm in control of American policy, and therefore able to carry through on commitments to increase East-West trade. Two years later, however, such a positive expectation for future trade could not be sustained in the wake of Watergate and the reassertion of Congressional power, at least at a price which was reasonable to the Soviets.This had much to do with the failure of detente, as I argue elsewhere. 40 A comparison of the arguments of trade expectations theory with those of liberal and realist theory is pre sented in Table 1. To summarize liberals contend that high economic dependence, as manifest in high trade levels, reduces a states likelihood of initiating war by providing a material constraint on unit-level forces for aggression. scurvy dependence will increase this likelihood, since this constraint on unit-level motives for war is removed.Realists argue that high dependence heightens the probability of war as dependent states struggle to reduce their vulnerability. In the realist world, however, low dependence should have no impact on the likelihood of war or peace that is, other factors should become causally determinant of war. Still, since economic interdependence is at least eliminated as a possible source of conflict, realists 39. Note that state A, the decision-making unit in the theory, can still be treated as a rational unitary actor respondingto the observed domestic forces on the other side. 0. See Copeland, Modeling Economic Interdependence and War,pp. 62-66. Internat ional trade institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by lowering transaction costs and facilitating the punishment of cheaters, may be an additional means to build positive expectations for future trade. Indeed, for some liberals, peace may only be likely when both interdependence and effective global institutions co-exist and reinforce one another Keohane, International Liberalism Reconsidered, p. 183.While such institutions may indeed affect trade expectations, they are unlikely to be as significant in history as the systemic and domestic factors just discussed, for the simple reason that these institutions are a creation of the post-World War II era. Moreover, since concerns for war and peace revolve mostly around the great powers, and powers like Soviet Union and China have been historically excluded from trade institutions like GATT, such institutions cannot account for fluctuations in the levels of tension between the United States and these powe rs since 1945.Finally, the institutional approach overlooks bilateraldiplomacy as the steer mechanism through which expectations of trade change consider the United States and Japan up to December 1941, or the United States and Japan today. 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A coffee shop

Of all tooshies in our neighborhood, the local coffee stock located just a a few(prenominal) steps away from my house is the coziest precise nook where one target spend the night.With a stylish interior, warm and friendly atmosphere and a diverse and dim public, it is the place to have a chat with friends or pick up a cup on the way to work. The extension of the place makes it the focus of the neighborhood, the hub that binds the all sweep unneurotic in a casual and intimate setting.1. InteriorWhen one walks in from a busy, hustled street, the first function that strikes the eye is the somewhat subdued interior with its dark colors and quiet tones. The curtains on the windows keep the light out, making the inside of the shop whole step shady. A ray of light falls on the counter, playing on the long row of tubs with all kinds of coffee brands and types.To the left are little tables with customers seated at them, sipping their morning coffee in anticipation of a long workin g solar day. Although the furniture in the store is not new, it retains an beauteous look thanks to its good quality, adding an impressive touch to the atmosphere.2. AtmosphereThis is the best place to get coffee in the area, and variety of coffee assortment strikes every(prenominal) visitor. The air is filled with an incredible number of coffee aromas mingled in an unforgettable mixture of nuances. Coffee smells infuse the air, flowing out into the street and variety with the fresh morning air so that every passer-by in time with the eyes closed can say that it is a coffee shop located in the street.The strong smell attracts the visitors into the store, making them expect exquisite coffee. At the entrance, one can hear the sounds of busy work as shop assistants rush back and forward packing the coffee, brewing the make happy for their clients, and pouring it into steaming cups. The sounds of talking, cups lifted off plates, and assistants working create a lively and energeti c atmosphere that in itself helps those fighting with the rest of quietness wake up and brace themselves for the long working day.3. PublicThe muckle in the shop are from all layers of society. One can see employees from varied companies hurrying to their working places, and a few housewives getting coffee for their families. some seem to know each other and exchange greetings so that the whole place is filled with cheerful, energetic voices. This makes more noise, but since most flock are speaking in a quiet manner, it is still soothing and does not disturb the visitors. It is one of the places where people come for the atmosphere that bonds them together and helps newcomers meet people that live around.ConclusionThe little coffee shop at the corner is an excellent place to start the day, which makes it central to the neighborhood. All sorts of people living around visit it regularly to meet friends and begin their day with a cup of coffee in the circle of friends rather than but in their kitchens. This makes it a great place and attracts the whole community to the area where they can take a break from their daily routines and inhale the redolent drink with the magic awakening effect.

Labouring the Walmart Way Essay

1 evermore low prices. Always. This is the slogan of the worlds largest corporation, a U.S.-based retailer whose big-box stores qualifying a one-stop shop, from groceries to garments to garden hoses. The secret of Walmarts success is to give consumers the lowest prices-14 percentage lower than its competitors (Greenhouse, 2003)-by increasing the efficiency of the supply chain, the productivity of the campaign force, and the use of get saving technology. Competitors must adopt a akin business plan, supply something Walmart does not, or go out of business-as Woolco, Eatons, Simp sons, and Woodwards have in Canada (Moore & Pareek, 2004). The influence of the Walmart model is not likely to wane in the near future. With over 235 stores in Canada and plans for rapid expansion, Walmart and its effects on labour are worth considering. Are its offers of jobs, its attitude toward unionization, and its influence on diligence labour practices worth the low price on the shelf?2 One of the most frequent complaints about Walmart, which employs 1.4 million people worldwide, is its sorrow to pay workers a living wage. Store employees are paid 20-30 percent less than the industry average, making many of them eligible for social assistance. It is estimated that American taxpayers fork out $2.5 billion a year in eudaimonia payments to Walmart employees (Head, 2004). Because the retailer hires hard-to-place workers, like recent immigrants, seniors, and single mothers, its employees are often scared they will not find work elsewhere. The kind of work Walmart does offer is gruelling stores are intentionally understaffed-the strategy behind the companys legendary productivity gains-so that existing employees will work harder (Head, 2004). It is alleged that systemic discrimination against women within the corporation has denied the majority of Walmart workers the chance at promotion, a charge that is now the subject of the largest civil-rights suit in U.S. history.

The Big Society: A Realistic Objective or a Political Myth?

Chapter 1 IntroductionSocio-political backgroundThe connection surrounded by obliging society and the verbalize reflects the changing nature of the popular private interaction and poses questions about the role of giving medication in advanced capitalist societies. The ceaselessly changing dynamics of the national-private co subsistence is a direct response to the processes of globalization and sophisticatedization, which brook placed the body politic in an entirely different realm, and rush challenged its parameters as a political entity.On the international level, what Samuel Huntington called the third loop of democratization (1991) has seen the globalization of world politics, and according to somewhat, the undermined capacity of the state (Cerny, 1990 Scholte, 2006 Rosenau 1990). The third wave of democratization in the world has likewise been marked by the draw close of the global well-bred society and the increasing power of non-governmental organizations a nd associations (Bull, 1977).On the domesticated level, a similar process keister be traced. Throughout the determination several decades, the traditional political ubiquity of the state has been challenged, with the rise of genteelised society and associational country (Baccaro, 2002). The state no longer pull throughs in its exhausted and narrow confinement as a provider of cosmos go. Its functions, theorists like Baccaro argue, absorb been divulged to the local communities and voluntary associations, which boast become the modernistic pillar non only of everyday opinion, but also for frequent advocacy in legislature. urbane society challenges the modern state to some extent, but its functions do non aim to undermine its capabilities. As this speaking go forth argue, they seek to reinforce them.1.2 Research aimsThis dissertation result hear the feasibility and sustainability of the crowing golf-club mold as a put of political governance. In order to do th is, the author will emphasis on the connection between the private and the public in the present-day(a) state, and will assess the resuscitating power of civil society in the public sector. It will illustrate the theoretical connection between the two with the critical analysis of a rather contemporary juxtaposition between civil society and the state, resolved by the Conservative Party in 2010. specialised aspects will cover the shift of state powers from the public to the private realm.1.3 historic trends before the double bon tonAlthough the sizeable hunting lodge was represented as a strategy by the Conservative Party, its ideological tenets suffer be assemble in earlier observations, related to the rise of an independent civil state and community intimacy.Attempts to accommodate civil society and the state in the alike(p) political equation have started at the turn of the last century, with a deep reconsideration of the main characteristics of advanced capitalist s ocieties and the role of the state. A predateing Marxist theorist, Antonio Gramsci proposes a classic division between the state and non-state elements of governance in his Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971). He views civil society as an organic entity, which exists beyond the realm of the government. The controversy in his theoretical lay of governance comes from the exaggerated view that the civil society can exist as a self-regulatory body in a stateless world. A much moderate view on the connection between civil society and the state is proposed by sociologist Max Weber. In his Politics of the Civil federation Weber discusses the idea of public citizenship and its role in megabucks democracy. He discusses civil society not as an alternative, but as a cultivating force, obligatory for the existence of the modern state (Weber, 2004). The Weberian approach to spirit civil society suggests that the connection between the public and private is not of necessity exclus ionary, as suggested by the Marxists. In his 1962 Capitalism and Political Freedom, economic expert Milton Friedman discusses economic neo-liberalism as an primal prerequisite for political freedom of the citizens. He emphasizes the central role of the government as a provider of legislature, which would bring down property rights and civil institutions. Friedmans economic philosophy of government preventive suggests a model of public-private form of governance. In an extensive study on amicable movements called beyond Left and Right, Anthony Giddens goes even further and suggests that social movements atomic number 18 stronger advocates for change than political parties are (Giddens, 1994). Last but not least, in his wheel Alone Americas Declining Social Capital (1995) Robert Putnam uses the rectify of voluntary associations and civic engagement to explain the social decay of the American community. As symptoms of social apathy, he points out the political disengagement of the American public and its growing distrust to the government (Putnam, 1995). The ideological tenet of the boastful golf-club can also be related to what Lucio Baccaro calls associational democracy (2002). He describes associational democracy as the intersection between civil society and the state. Baccaros vision of decentralization and vestment of the local communities can be used to fit the stupendous Society into a wider theoretical realm. Baccaro offers a model of public-private governance, which reveals elements of societal conservatism bathroom the Big Societys main goal the shift of regulatory powers from the government bureaucrats into the hold of the people.It is not difficult to notice a historical trend on the changing divisions between civil society and the state. Last several decades have witnessed a major shift towards empowerment of the private sector, and transfer of powers and regulatory functions in the hands civil society organizations. This trend does not necessarily mean however that the state as a provider of go and individual well-being is in decline. On the contrary, this historic tipency suggests that civil society is a pillar, not a threat to the state and can act as a channel for reform in the public sector. The next section will examine its contemporary manifestations as a policy, proposed by David Cameron and the Conservative Party in 2010.1.4. What is the Big SocietyIn July 2010 in Liverpool, later the general elections, David Cameron re-launched the Big Society Programme, which was to become part of the political computer program of the new coalition government. The programme had five main tenets localism and much power for the communities volunteerism transfer of power from central to local government domiciliate of cooperatives, charities, and social enterprises transparency of government legislation (Cameron, 2010). Under the Big Society programme, initiatives such as the Big Society Bank and the National Citi zen good (NCS) were established.The idea behind the Big Society is to attribute more responsibilities to the citizens as tell apart participants in the policy-making process. According to David Cameron, its main purpose was to propose a ground up approach of governance, where power and ideas will withhold from the people (Cameron, 2010). The Conservative Party proposed the Big Society Project as the engine of public sector reform.The government indicated that the Big Society would empower local communities in their attempts to solve problems in their own neighborhood, and to voice their opinions.1.4.1 political orientationThe ideology behind the Big Society is an unconventional type of conservatism. It views booming governance as a hybrid between the private and the public sectors, and citizens initiative as a prerequisite for associational democracy. The idea behind the Big Society is very often confused with classic Marxism, which offers an complete and rather Utopian view of civic associations as a necessary replacement of the state. The rise of a big society however, does not intimate the demise of the state. The Big Society can be interpreted as a politically sensible response to the economic recession, poverty, and social breakdown. It has lead to Camerons recognition of the role of the public sector and volunteerism as antidotes of a disintegrating society (Bochel &038 Defty, 2010 Evans, 2011 Smith, 2010). The ideas of the Big Society diverge from the stance of some of David Camerons predecessors such as Margaret Thatcher, because it recognizes the role of non-state associations as advocates for political change and providers for the citizens. At the same time, it does not use the societal factor as an umbrella for a smaller government (Norman, 2011 Smith, 2010). Therefore, the ideology behind the Big Society can be described as societal conservatism. Societal should not be confused with social (or socialist), because the Big Society project doe s not exclude privatization within the welfare sector and public sector cuts.1.4.2 ResponsesThe Big Society project has provoked mixed responses. Its supporters claim that the idea to connect the public and the private sector as providers for the citizens is revolutionary and democratically advanced. Liberals tend to view this idea as innovative, because it emphasizes the role of the citizens in shaping modern day policy.The main criticisms of the Big Society are that is has been used to warrant the radical budget cuts in the public and social sectors, and is too utopian to be implemented in practice. A popular criticism points to the omit of citizens incentive and appropriate skills, which are prerequisites for a fulfilling civic participation (Grint &038 Holt, 2011 Hasan, 2010).1.4.3 topical anesthetic empowerment and decentralizationLocalism and decentralization have been key tenets on the Big society agenda. Some of the proposals, designed to empower local government activi ty and citizens include introducing directly elected mayors and police commissioners devolving the financial powers of local government increasing transparency and letting local citizens choose the organisational structure of their local council (Inside Government, 2011).The ideology behind local empowerment and decentralization is akin to the neo-liberal political thought. The transformation of local empowerment into an actual policy came to life in March 2011, when the Localism Bill was passed by the House of Commons despite controversies over social housing (Hodge, 2011). Some of the prescriptions of the Localism Bill have already been put into practice. Ministers have started giving councils greater financial freedom, by devolving ?7 billion more of government funding. They have removed burdens and bureaucratic controls so that they local governments can prioritize budgets to support public services in carriages, which meet the priorities of local people and communities (Commu nities &038 Local Government, 2011).This is one way to enhance reform in the public sector, as it will have more incentive for local governments to improve their services, and they will be change from recipients of policy, into actual initiators of one.1.4.4 VolunteerismAnother important tenet of the Big Society Project is the idea of volunteerism and civic associations. The new government has encouraged voluntary organizations and social enterprises, as another way to reform the public sector. Two of the key programmes, related to Big Society volunteerism are the National Citizens Service (NCS) and club Organizers. These two programmes target thousands of volunteers of all age groups and different social backgrounds nationwide, and their participation in community projects in 2011 and 2012 (Cabinet Office, 2011).The ideology behind volunterrism relates to associational democracy, which holds that democratization does not necessarily come from the state, but also from the citizen ry, with its accumulated incentives and skills. As far as policy is concerned, both NCS and Community Organizers already exist as programmes. Whether efficacy has been achieved will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.In general, the Big Society is an opportunity for citizens to participate in the actual process of policy-making and to provide first-hand feedback to those responsible for legislation. The most important component of the Big Society is the financial autonomy of the local councils, because it will play important part in the allocation of budgets. Local councils drive in the needs of their residents better than the national government (Smith, 2010 Norman, 2011). Their financial plans will be much more realistic and sustainable, targeting the public sectors policies, which have the biggest demand and have been starved for resources in the past. Financial decentralization can bring not only better quality of public sector services, but also more realistic re sponse to the actual needs of the local residents.1.5 SummaryThis chapter has traced the historical and policy features of the idea of the Big Society, and has examined some of its basic tenets. The remaining chapters will examine in detail the feasibility of the Big Society as a form of political governance, which can make local communities more involved in the policy-making process.Bibliography Baccaro, L. (2002) Civil Society Meets the State A Model of Associational Democracy. International Labour Office working Paper No. DP/138/2002. on tap(predicate) at SSRN http//ssrn.com/abstract=334860 or doi10.2139/ssrn.334860Retrieved 05.03.2012Bochel, H. &038 Defty, A. (2010) Safe as HouseConservative Social Policy, reality Opinion and fan tan, The Political Quarterly, Vol 81, No 1, January-MarchBull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society A Study of put together in World Politics. Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillianCabinet Office (2010) Government Launches Big Society Programme, 18 May, Availa ble at http//www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ parole/government-launches-big-society-programmeRetrieved 05.03.2012___________ (2010) Government Puts Big Society at the Heart of public Sector Reform, 18 MayAvailable at http//www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/big-society-heart-public-sector-reformRetrieved 05.03.2012___________ (2010) Building the Big Society, Available at http//www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/building-big-society.pdfRetrieved 05.03.2012Cameron, D. (2010) Big Society Speech, Monday, 19 JulyAvailable at http//www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/07/big-society-speech-53572Retrieved 05.03.2012Cerny, P.G. (1990). The Changing Architecture of Politics Structure, self-assurance and the Future of the State, LondonCommunities and Local Government (2011) The Localism Bill attach a turning point, 7 June, Available at http//www.communities.gov.uk/news/corporate/1917316Retrieved 05.03.2012Della Porta, D. &038 Diani, M. (2006). Social Movements An Introduction. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, UK. p. 93-113Evans, K. (2011) Big Society in the UK A Policy Review, Vol 25, know 2, pp. 164-171, MarchFriedman, M. (1962) The Relation between frugal Freedom and Political Freedom, Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press, pp. 7-17Available at http//www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/friedman.htmRetrieved 05.03.2012Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics, Stanford University PressGramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and WishartGrint, K. &038 Holt, C. (2011) Leading Questions If replete(p) Place, Big Society and local leadership are the answers Whats the question?, Leadership, 7 (I) 85-98Hasan, M. (2010) The Sham of Camerons Big Society, forward-looking Statesman, 22 NovemberHodge, K. (2011) Localism bill passed, advice for the elderly and regeneration cash, trapping Network Blog, Guardian, 19 MayAvailable at http//www.guardian.co.uk/housing-network/2011/may/19/lo calism-bill-advice-elderly-regeneration-cashRetrieved 05.03.2012Huntington, S. P. (1991) Democracys Third Wave. The Journal of Democracy, 2(2)Inside Government (2011) Big Society 2011 Empowering Communities, Encouraging Social Action and Opening Up Public Services, 31 MarchAvailable at http//www.insidegovernment.co.uk/economic_dev/big-society-2011/Retrieved 05.03.2012Marquand, D. (2004) The Decline of the Public Hollowing Out Citizenship, Polity Press, CambridgeNorman, J. (2011) The Anatomy of the New Politics Buckingham University of Buckingham PressPutnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone. Americas Declining Social Capital Journal of Democracy 6, 65-78Available at http//canonsociaalwerk.be/1995_Putnam/1995,%20Putnam,%20bowling%20alone.pdfRosenau, J.N. (1990) Turbulence in World Politics A theory and Continuity, LondonScholte, J.A.(2006). Globalization a Critical Introduction. Palgrave Macmilian, UK. p. 13-123Smith, M. (2010) From Big Government to Big Society Changing the StateSociety Ba lance, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 818-833Weber, M. (2004) Politics of the Civil Society, Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Art Tatum Essay

From the time Tatum was born on Oct. 13, 1909 in Toledo, Ohio, he was articled for revolutionizing jazz. He was born with a blind eye and the other partially blind, further his ears were his way of dealing the world. He could sit d cause and melt down feather the same music meant for four workforce. He was unbeat fitting at whatever piano competition. His influence on jazz will be forever respected by jazz pianists (and non-pianists) worldwide.As a child, artistry current a little formal training for piano at Toledo develop of Music, but he mainly just taught himself. By the age of 18, he was already playing for radio broadcasts and even had his own show at one point. By age 24, he wrote and released Tiger Rag, a nisus fully equipped with fast beats, incredibly technical rhythms, and the need for acquisition. As he continued in his musical career, his articulation, style, and individuality all got better.Art changed the entire face of jazz music. He helped lead the next multiplication into the bebop era. He was the musician that started to change the chord progressions, fingered with the harmonics, and tried new inversions of different chords (to get a more jazzy sound). Tatum was able to use his classical background and his jazzy style to create his own type of music. It was technical and complex, but still full of the freestyle that jazz so easily expresses. He used his leftover-handedness to create extreme bass part parts and his right hand to create beautiful runs up and down the entire piano.Art had incredible ears. Although he was nearly blind in one eye and completely blind in the other, he could see gross(a)ly when it came to music. It was verbalize that Tatum could find the dominant note in a flushing toilet. He had incredible pitch, so he knew exactly which notes would sound perfect with the others. In regard to his piano, they called him, God because he was so good. Tatum never stop playing piano. It was his life. As one man said, T atum played so brightly and so muchthat I thought the piano was gonna break. My mother left the roomso I said Whats wrong, Mama? And she said Oh, that man plays too much piano.Even extremely critical large number would compliment him for his piano skills. Whenever he ever entered a competition for piano, he never lost. Arts style of music was not the simple, effortless music that anybody could play. His technique was mastered. He had the most intricate ornamentation in every line of a song he played. Not only that, but he didnt even seem give care he was trying. As he pounded away at the keys, it didnt seem like pounding but more floating. It seemed so effortless to him. Hank Jones said, When I ultimately met him and got a chance to hear him play in person, it seemed as if he wasnt really exerting much effort, he had an effortless way of playing.It was deceptive. Youd watch him and you couldnt believe what was coming out, what was reaching your ears. He didnt have that much mot ion at the piano. He didnt feature a big show of moving around and waving his hands and going through all sorts of physical gyrations to produce the music that he produced, so that in itself is amazing. There had to be intense concentration there, but you couldnt tell by just looking at him play. Tatum was revolutionary. He led future jazz musicians into the next era of jazz. He had the skill and the mind of a genius, and for that, he will never be forgotten.Resourceshttp//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art_Tatum bolthttp//www.duke.edu/njh3/biography.html

Martha McCaskey

fundament Martha Mackey had arrived at an Impasse In her career requiring her to confront a determination which put her Integrity and possible career advancement In opposition. Mackeys natural selection came down to how she handled Phil Devon, an ex- employee with knowledge of proprietary info Mackey needed for a thickening. Obtaining the information through Devon would earn Mackey a significant promotion and salary increase. However, doing so under the false pretenses she had constructed ch either(prenominal)enged her ethics, Jeopardized her Integrity, and was potentially illegal.On the another(prenominal) hand, failure to obtain the development would derail Mackeys career and undermine her efforts toward advancement. Diagnosis Mackey was a tallly heavy individual, as made evident by her success in her undergraduate and graduate career. Her decision to return to school in pursuit of her MBA demonstrates her high ambition and level of investment in her career. In the eight een months that Mackey had been with Sellers Associates sedulousness Analysis Dillon (AID) she had proven her ability as a consultant on multiple pukes. Her performance had garnered the attention of key leadinghip personnel,Tom Mal whizz and TTY Richardson, and raised the forbid for expectations at AID. Mackey accomplished this through hard work and long hours, refusing to take for granted the flabby way pop out, and maintaining a high moral standard despite knowing that high morals were non necessarily upheld by all of her coworkers in the member. Knowing Mackeys dedication and investment In her career It Is easy to understand why the decision around how to handle the silicon 6 situation was so troubling. The future of Mackeys career with AD would be heavy Influenced by her decision and the success or failure of the project.This was especially professedly considering the importance of the projects customer, a semiconductor manufacturer who supplied twenty percent of D ads ancestry. The outcome of the Silicon 6 project was of great consequence to Dads leading and the Division as a whole success promised continued and Increased business from their primary client failure would result In the loss of the client and law fifth of the Dads business. Mackey faced several challenges exerting pressures on her decision, one of which was time. A meeting had been arranged with the senior management on theSilicon 6 project which only gave Mackey a month to obtain the inevitable information and bring to pass the project. Adding to the challenge was the inherent culture indoors the industry of accepting wrong behaviors which, to Mackey and others In the new guard, was becoming more apparent. In the past Mackey had tangle pressure from Malone and Richardson to engage In the standard wrong practices of the industry, particularly following one project Malone and Richardson felt, could go for been completed with less time and effort (p. ). Malone was the one to bring up Mackeys possibly source of information, referring to Devon, in conversations with the client for Silicon 6 moreover, Malone was the one to suggest a instinctiveness to use the source. Mackey also needfully to consider the Impact her decision and the continuation misalignment developed amongst Sellers and AD as a function of the distance and independence of AD and its leaders from headquarters. Mackey is aware that unified policies are not clearly communicated and represented at the Division.The publicity that would result from legal action against the unethical practices within AD would surely impact Sellers as a whole, with consequential impacts reaching easy beyond Just the small group at the Division. Leaders at Sellers could turn out to be allies for Mackey in addressing this challenge as they are invested in what is best for the entire company, not Just AD. another(prenominal) challenge contributing to the problem is the ambiguity surrounding Phil Devotes m otivations, intentions, and awareness of the situation. Mackey does not know where Devon stands or how he will react to various situations.Mackey is faint-hearted whether Devon is a disgruntled former employee seeking vengeance against his former employer and is, therefore, willing to share proprietary information, or if the information she is seeking is even proprietary to begin with. There is also a possibility that Devon could alert leadership at the competing company or even the authorities if he discovers Mackeys uncoiled identity and intentions. To this point Mackeys decisions and actions have been merely to avoid engaging in behaviors she deemed too unethical rather than to address the behaviors encouraged and practiced within the AD.This has mightinessd her into a corner here she has few options to address the pop without compromising the success of a major project and Jeopardizing her career. Furthermore, her decision to drop score into discussions with Devon under th e false pretenses she created constrains her to maintaining the lie or risk damaging transaction with Devon by revealing her true identity and motivations. The result of the relationship with Devon has many a(prenominal) potential consequences which are unpredictable given how little is known rough Devotes interests.Action Plan The objective of the fire to addressing the problem at hand is to maintain rather encroachment beyond Mackeys ethical comfort level magic spell doing as little damage as possible to her career prospects. Mackey first gear needs to confront Malone and Richardson with her concerns regarding the ethical nature and legal ramifications of paying Devon for potentially proprietary information. In all likelihood Malone and Richardson will dismiss her concerns because it is only when business as usual for the AD.At that point simply handing the project off to Kaufmann would not address the ethical dilemma it would merely be a means of problem avoidance for Mac key, which is all she has done to this point. Her next shade would be to contact the top leadership at Sellers to confirm corporate policies regarding the procurement of proprietary information. Mackey will likely find that company polity prohibits payoffs to obtain proprietary information belonging to other companies in put in to protect the greater interests of Sellers.Assuming that this is the case, to protect her integrity, and that of Sellers, Mackey will have to disclose the pay offfulness about her identity and motivations to Devon. Subsequently, Mackey will be able to find out whether the information Devon has is proprietary, assuming Devon is still willing to operate. Her actions from that point should be control by Sellers company policy the information she obtains should be strictly non-proprietary. disregardless of long term she will still need to address the unethical behaviors that pervade the AD.Her choice then becomes to alert leadership at Sellers of the unet hical behaviors of Richardson, Malone, Kaufmann, and others throughout AD, or leave Sellers. Either course risks the career Mackey has created for herself however, it is necessary if Mackey hopes to maintain her integrity. Likely her best option is to notify Sclerosis dervish group of the conditions at AD. In doing so Mackey will help protect Sellers and all employees working in the other branches of the company. It also may reveal other opportunities for Mackey in Sellers and the AD.Failure of this approach would simply leave her where she would have otherwise been, with her integrity intact looking for a new Job as a consultant with AD on her resume. Overall Learning From this case I learned that not all decisions are as simple as full versus wrong, some of the nigh difficult decisions will be between right and right. It is also often hose right versus right decisions that force us to reflect on our own locate and what is most grave to ourselves. Right versus right decisions create opportunities for explicitly defining our values.In Mackeys case it would have been better for her to address the ethical dilemmas she encountered earlier in her career so that she would have been able to operate without a major deadline looming and pressure from the client and her managers. Furthermore, Mackey experienced discomfort while facing her right versus right decision which called into question her deeply ingrained values. This is directly in line with Abductors hypothesis surrounding defining moments for individuals. It is these feelings and intuitions which translate core values in a time of conflict.The prevailing values, according to Obduracy, will be those that are the most deeply rooted in ones life. Obduracy reasons that, a conclave of profit and shrewdness, coupled with imagination and boldness, will help one implement his personal understand of what is right. I would argue that his is not only true, but that, a combination of expediency and shrewdness , coupled with imagination and boldness, ill help, preserve the most of ones values when confronted by such a situation.I feel that, in a right versus right defining moment, it is not necessary to abandon one set of values in favor of another assuming an adroit approach is taken to address the situation. Creativity will allow someone to demoralise the most out of a situation. After analyzing this case and the associated material I mostly feel compelled to be more conscious of right versus right cases that may be developing. I also feel that when faced with these types of decisions I will need to be more aware of the message my actions grade to those around me.